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Queen’s Uniuersitv, 
Kingston, Ontario, Canada K7L 3N6 
The “specification logic” of J. C. Reynolds is a partial-correctness logic for 
Algol 60-like languages with procedures. It is interpreted here as an intuitionistic 
theory, using a form of possible-world semantics first applied to programming 
language interpretation by J. C. Reynolds and F. J. Oles to give an abstract treatment 
of stack-oriented storage management. The model provides a satisfactory solution 
to all previously known problems with the interpretation of specification logic; 
however, unexpected new problems have been discovered in doing this work, and 
these remain unsolved. ti‘l 1990 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the beginning, C. A. R. Hoare (1969) created a programming logic for 
specification triples of the form {P} C {Q}. And Hoare’s logic is good (for 
simple imperative programming languages without procedures or jumps). 
It is both sound (Hoare and Lauer, 1974) and, independently of how the 
vexed question of its completeness might be answered (de Bakker, 1975; 
Cook, 1978; Wand, 1978; Bergstra and Tucker, 1982; Goldblatt, 1982; 
Clarke, 1984; Leivant, 1985; Pasztor, 1986; Leivant and Fernando, 1987), 
usable (Reynolds, 198 la), providing a framework for rigorous specification, 
development, and verification of practical programs. 
Many attempts have been made to extend Hoare’s logic to languages 
with procedures or jumps (Hoare, 1971; Clint and Hoare, 1972; Arbib and 
Alagic, 1979; de Bakker, 1980; Gries and Levin, 1980; Olderog, 1984; 
Trakhtenbrot, Halpern, and Meyer, 1984; Sieber, 1985). The “specification 
logic” of J. C. Reynolds (1981a, 1982) is perhaps the most important of 
these, because its generality, usability, and coherence have been clearly 
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demonstrated. The aim of the research described here is to do the same for 
its soundness. 
Specification logic is essentially a many-sorted first-order theory, with 
Hoare triples as atomic formulas, and conventional logical connectives, 
such as conjunction, implication, and quantification. There are some addi- 
tional atomic formulas to permit expression of certain kinds of assumptions 
about free identifiers, such as non-interference. A fairly conventional seman- 
tics for specification logic is outlined in Reynolds (1981a); however, it 
has been known for some ‘time that this model has two fundamental 
deficiencies. 
The first deficiency is that commands are interpreted in an undesirably 
operational way: command meanings are functions from an initial state to 
the (possibly infinite) sequence of all states encountered during execution 
of the command. This kind of interpretation is undesirable because it 
distinguishes between commands whose “externally observable” behaviours 
are identical. ‘But it seemed to be necessary in order to interpret non-inter- 
ference formulas: C # P asserts that the value of P is invariant throughout 
any (terminating) execution of command C. 
The second deficiency is that Section 11 of Reynolds (1982) proposes two 
axioms, strong constancy and leftside non-interference composition, which 
are intuitively true and seem to be very desirable or essential for verifying 
certain kinds of programs, yet which are shown there to be invalid relative 
to the interpretation in Reynolds (1981a). 
This paper describes a new approach to capturing the intended inter- 
pretation of specification logic. We now give an informal (and simplified) 
presentation of the model. 
The first idea is adapted from the treatment of block-structured storage 
management described in Reynolds (1981b) and Oles (1982, 1985): the 
semantics of a phrase is a suitably related family of environment-to- 
meaning functions for different sets of allowable states. For example, the 
semantics of a command for some state-set X is a continuous function from 
environments appropriate for X to partial functions (or binary relations) 
on X. For a control structure such as C,; Cz, the meaning for any state-set 
is expressed as a function of the meanings of the immediate constituents C, 
and C, for the same state-set. This ensures that “intermediate” states 
between the executions of C, and C2 will also belong to that state-set, 
without requiring that these intermediate states be explicit in command 
meanings. A specification now becomes a predicate about state-sets as well 
as environments. In logic, this is known as “possible-world” semantics 
(Goldblatt, 1979); here, each set of allowed states is a possible world. 
A satisfactory interpretation of C # P for any possible world X is then 
definable as follows. For any value v that P might have, let XV be the subset 
of X for which the value of P is v; then C # P if and only if, for all v, any 
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terminating execution of C in X whose initial state is in X,, is also a 
terminating execution of C in X,,. 
Consider now the proposed axiom of strong constancy (Reynolds, 1982), 
C#R&({R}-{P)C’(Q})=>{RandP}C{RandQ), 
where C is a command, R, P, and Q are assertions, and the static-assertion 
specification (R} is equivalent to {true} skip {RI. Intuitively, if R holds 
before executing C and C does not interfere with R, then, while reasoning 
about C, it should be possible to treat R as if it were a “local” mathemati- 
cal fact. For example, if C implements the binary-search algorithm and R 
asserts that the array being searched is sorted, then it is obvious by inspec- 
tion that C # R, and so it is convenient to be able to “factor” R out of the 
specification of C, provided it is still possible to use R in the verification 
of c. 
Unfortunately, {R) holds just if assertion R is true at all allowable 
states, not merely those that might be encountered while executing C, and 
so strong constancy is invalid according to a conventional interpretation. 
There is a similar problem with the proposed axiom scheme of leftside 
non-interference composition. 
The essence of the solution proposed here is to adopt a non-classical 
interpretation of specification implication, inspired by Kripke’s semantics 
for intuitionistic logic (Kripke, 1965, Dummett, 1977, van Dalen, 1983). The 
reason for interpreting specification logic as an intuitionistic theory is to 
take advantage of what in (McCarty 1984) is termed axiomatic freedom, 
the recognition that intuitionistic logic allows axioms which are classically false 
but mathematically efficient to be consistent with powerful theories. 
In fact, the equivalences, axioms, and rules presented by Reynolds are 
intuitionistically acceptable. (Reductio ad absurdurn is not the correct name 
for rule RlO in Reynolds, 1981a.) Furthermore, Reynolds has shown that if 
the classical but non-intuitionistic law 1 ~S=P S were added to specifica- 
tion logic, then a formula asserting non-termination of a simple assignment 
command would be derivable; this shows that the only models possible for 
a classical version of specification logic would be trivial ones in which com- 
mands do not terminate unless they leave the state unchanged. Reynolds’ 
example is reproduced in the Appendix to this paper. 
The new interpretation of the implication connective is essentially as 
follows: define S, j Sz to be true for X only if, for all subsets X’ of X, S2 
holds for X’ whenever S, holds for X’. The implicit quantification over 
restricted possible worlds is needed in general to preserve the monotonicitJ 
of specification interpretation in the following sense: if any specification S 
holds for possible world X, then S holds for any more-restricted possible 
world X’. 
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To see how this interpretation of the implication connective helps with 
strong constancy, let X’ be the subset of state-set X for which R holds, and 
suppose that execution of C in X can map initial state x0 to final state x,, 
where x0 satisfies both R and P. Then assumption C # R ensures that the 
execution from x0 to X, can also take place in X’, so that X, satisfies R. 
Furthermore, with the new interpretation of implication, assumption 
{RI * {P> C iQ> ensures that x, also satisfies Q, because, by definition, 
R holds for all states in X’. This validates strong constancy. 
Similarly, consider the following form of the axiom scheme of leftside 
non-interference composition (Reynolds, 1982), 
C # R & (I # R* {P: C {Q),* (P} C {Q}, 
where I is a command identifier, C is a command, and P, Q, and R are 
assertions. Suppose again that execution of C in possible world X can map 
x0 to Xl, where x0 satisfies P. Let X’ be the subset of X for which R has 
the same value as it does at x0. Then assumption C # R ensures that the 
execution from x0 to x1 can also take place in X’. Because of examples like 
(AC: comm . skip)(C), it does nor in general follow from C # R that I # R, 
even when I occurs in C; however, in possible world X’ execution of I 
cannot interfere with R, so that, using the new interpretation of implica- 
tion, the second assumption ensures that x1 satisfies Q. 
Our interpretation of non-interference also validates certain non- 
interference decomposition axioms. For example, for any command C and 
integer expression E, the following is an instance of rightside non- 
interference decomposition that is valid in our model. 
C # E*C # (E>O), 
where C # E for an expression E means that any execution of C preserves 
the value of E invariant. However, the formal system also includes “higher- 
order” instances of these axioms, such as 
G # E*G # (E>O) 
for G: comm -+ comm (i.e., G is a procedure whose arguments and calls are 
commands). When G: comm + comm and E is an expression-like phrase 
such as an expression or an assertion, Reynolds defined G # E to be 
equivalent to the following formula: 
VC: comm . C # E- G(C) # E. 
But, consider the following G: comm -+ comm: 
AC:comm.ifi=l then(C;ifi>l theni:=O). 
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G # i is true using Reynolds’ definition, yet G # (i > 0) is false, because, 
for example, 
(if i>O then i:= i+ 1) # (i>O) 
is true and 
G(ifi>Otheni:= i+l) # (i>O) 
is false. Hence, higher-order instances of rightside non-interference 
decomposition do not hold in general (using Reynolds’ interpretation of 
higher-order non-interference). We will return to this problem in Section 6. 
2. SYNTAX 
The type structure for the language to be considered is given in Table 1. 
For simplicity, we have avoided coercions and conventional variables (but 
have retained acceptors, which are the “updating” components of variables; 
see Reynolds (1980, 1981b). Informally, a data type z (such as boolean or 
integer) denotes a set [t] of values appropriate for some acceptor or 
TABLE I 
Phrase Types 
Metavariables 
Productions 
0 :: = val[r] 
I explrl 
1 comm 
laccC71 
IO-0 
a ::= assert 
18-ta 
/?::= Olu 
y::= p 
Iv= 
data types 
ordinary phrase types 
assertional phrase types 
bindable phrase types 
general phrase types 
values 
expressions 
commands 
acceptors 
ordinary procedures 
assertions 
assertion procedures 
specifications 
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expression, whereas a phrase type y denotes a set or poset [[rj of meanings 
appropriate for some kind of phrase. Assertional phrase types and 
specifications are distinguished from ordinary phrase types because 
meanings of “logical” phrases need not be computable. All phrase types 
except specifications are bindable; i.e., their meanings are denotable by 
identifiers. The phrase types explike and commlike that appear in 
Reynolds (1981a, 1982) can be dispensed with when dealing only with the 
basic axioms (rather than the derived rules, such as the rules for procedure 
declaration). 
In a conventional semantics with a fixed set S of states, [val[T]J would 
be the flat domain obtained by “lifting” the set [rl of r-values, [exp[r]l 
would be the domain of functions from S to [val[z]j, [commn would be 
the domain of partial functions on S, [acc[r]j would be the domain of 
functions from [SD to [commj, [O --f 0’1 would be the domain of con- 
tinuous functions from 101 to Eel], [r assert] would be the set of functions 
from S to truth values, [p -+ a] would be the set of all functions from h/31 
to [an, and [specn would be the set of truth values. 
The abstract syntax of the basic language of specification logic is given 
in Table II. A type assignmenr, z, is a function from a finite set of iden- 
tifiers, dom(rr), to bindable phrase types. The notation (rr 11 ~--r p) denotes 
the type assignment rc’ such that dom(x’) = dam(n) u {z}, and rc’(i’) = p if 
I’ = I, and ~(2’) otherwise, and similarly for (rt 1 zi H p, I . I z, H p,). The 
same kind of notation will be used for extending environments. 
The phrase-class meta-variable (rt + y ) ranges over well-formed phrases 
having type y when the types of their free identifiers (at least) are given by 
rt. Productions for value phrases, expressions, and acceptors (other than 
the “generic” ones for identifiers and applications) and more-complex 
control structures, such as conditionals, recursion, and loops, are omitted 
merely to simplify the presentation. Jumps will be discussed briefly in 
Section 6. A “variable” declaration binds a pair of (distinct) identifers to 
suitably related acceptor and expression meanings, respectively; this is 
simply to avoid the irrelevant complications that would arise with implicit 
conversions such as de-referencing. 
Assertions are conventional first-order formulas over the data types, but 
non-terminating and partially defined expressions (not assertions) are 
allowed, so there are also “delinedness” predicates D,( .) for each data type 
r. The productions for specifications show that the specification language of 
Reynolds has been augmented by 
(i) a constant absurd, which never holds even for the null state-set, 
unlike the static-assertion specification {false} used for this purpose in 
Reynolds (1981a, 1982), and 
(ii) an atomic formula for equivalence of phrases. 
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TABLE II 
Abstract Syntax 
((nllHp)l-/l)::= 1 
(n+e+o’) ::= Ir:e-((alIHe)+e’) 
(n+e)::= (n+e’+e)((nFe’)) 
(n+/?+a)::= h:j?.((nItk-+P)+a) 
(nt-a)::= (Et-fi+a)((n+j)) 
(nbassert) ::= truelfalse 
1 not ( TZ c assert ) 
[(nt-assert)and (a+assert) 
IV~:r.((nI~~val[r])~aassert) 
ID,(<n+expCrl>) 
I(n~explrl>=,(n~expCrl> 
1 
(z+comm) ::= skip 
I(xI--comm); (711-comm) 
I(n+acc[r]):=.(nt-exp[r]) 
1 new[z] l,l’ in 
((n~r~acc[5]~~‘~exp[tJ)+eomm) 
I 
(n+-spec) ::= absurd 
(n+spec)&<~f---spec) 
(ncspee)~(K+Spec) 
vr:~.((zIl~~)+Spec> 
(nf--y> =y (n+-v>. 
{(nbassert)} (z+comm){(n+-assert)} 
(n t-comm) # (n t-assert) 
identifier 
ordinary abstraction 
ordinary application 
assertional abstraction 
assertional application 
constants 
negation 
conjunction 
universal quantification 
defhedness 
equality 
null 
sequencing 
assignment 
variable declaration 
absurdity 
conjunction 
implication 
quantification 
equivalence 
Hoare-triple 
non-interference 
There should be no difficulty adding logical operators for disjunction and 
existential quantification, but there seems to be no reason to do so. The 
negation of S is definable as S =S absurd, and {P}, the static-assertion form 
of specification, is definable as (true} skip (P}. 
Value phrase types val[z] are introduced to allow quantification over 
values, as suggested in Sieber (1985); for example, if C: comm and 
E: exp[z], C # E can be defined to be VI: val[z] . C # (E = r t), for any z 
not free in C or E, assuming the obvious coercion from val[z] to exp[r]. 
A “good-variable” specification and non-interference specifications for 
acceptors and procedures will be defined later. 
3. POSSIBLE WORLDS 
In order to treat procedures and variable declarations conveniently, the 
model described formally in the rest of this paper is based on a category- 
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theoretic formulation of possible-world semantics (Goldblatt, 1979). In this 
framework, possible worlds and changes of possible world form a category, 
X, and semantic domains are replaced by semantic-domain functors from X 
to either S, the usual category of sets and functions, for “logical” phrase 
types, or the category D of directed-complete posets and continuous 
functions for the “computational” phrase types, Then each phrase, Z, 
of the language is interpreted as a natural transformation, [IIZg, from an 
appropriate “environment” functor, Env, to an appropriate semantic- 
domain functor, D, so that, if x and y are possible worlds and f: x +y is 
a change of possible worlds, the following diagram commutes in S or D: 
u-3 .r 
- D(x) 
I 
D(f) 
Y EnW4 i[zgl D(y) 
In the Introduction, changes of possible world were restrictions to 
subsets. But if the programming language has variable declarations, it must 
also be possible to expand the set of states, as in Reynolds, (1981b) and 
Oles, (1982, 1985). The appropriate generalization seems to be the 
following category: the objects are sets, interpreted as the sets of states 
allowed in each possible world, and a morphism from X to Y is a pair 
f, Q having the following properties: 
(i) f is a function from Y to X; 
(ii) Q is an equivalence relation on Y; and 
(iii) f restricted to any Q-equivalence class is injective; i.e., for all y, 
y’~ Y, if yQy’ and f(y)=f(y’), then y=y’. 
Intuitively, f extracts the small stack embedded in a larger one, and Q 
relates large stacks with identical “extensions.” The category described in 
Oles (1982) is similar, but there the function f is required to be bijective on 
equivalence classes, so that Y g Xx Y/Q. 
The identity morphism id, on an object X has as its two components: 
the identity function on X, and the universally true binary relation on X. 
The composition (in diagrammatic order) f, Q; g, R : X + Z of morphisms 
f, Q : X+ Y and g, R : Y + Z has as its two components: the functional 
composition off and g, and the equivalence relation on Z that relates 
zO, z, EZ just if they are R-related and Q relates g(zO) and g(zi). We can 
show that, for h,S =f, Q; g, R, the function h E Z -+ X is injective on 
S-equivalence classes as follows. Consider z, z’ E Z such that zSz’ and 
h(z) =h(z’); then zRz’ and g(z) Qg(z’) by the definition of S, and 
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f(g(z)) =f(g(z’)) by the definition of h. By the injectivity of f on 
Q-equivalence classes, g(z) =g(z’), and then, by the injectivity of g on 
R-equivalence classes, z = z’. 
For any object X in this category, we need a restriction morphism 
r X’ : X -+ x’ for any subset X’ of X, and an expansion morphism 
x I/: A’+ Xx V for any data type V. The restriction morphism rX’ has as 
its components: the insertion function from X’ into X, and the universally 
true binary relation on X’. The expansion morphism x V has as its 
components: the projection function from Xx V to X, and the equivalence 
relation that relates (x,, vO) and (x1, vl) in Xx V only if v0 = v,. Our 
notation for these morphisms does not make the domain object X explicit, 
but this will always be evident from context. 
4. SEMANTIC-DOMAIN FUNCTORS 
Our aim in this section is to define the semantic-domain functors for our 
model. We begin by defining a number of general constructions in 
categories of sets, complete partially ordered sets, and functors. Let S be 
the usual category of sets and functions. Let D be the category of directed- 
complete partially ordered sets and continuous functions (Reynolds, 1977); 
the objects of this category will be termed here domains, whether or not 
they have least elements. Throughout, “id,” will denote the identity 
morphism on object x and “r will denote composition of morphisms or 
functors in diagrammatic order. 
For any domains D and D’, we define new domains as follows. 
(i) Product. D x D’ is the Cartesian product of D and D’, ordered 
component-wise. 
(ii) Lifting. D, is (an isomorphic copy of) D augmented by a new 
least element, denoted 1. 
(iii) Exponentiation. D + D’ is the set of all continuous functions 
from D to D’, ordered point-wise. 
(iv) Partial exponention. D vu) D’ is the set of all continuous’ partial 
functions from D to D’, ordered point-wise; i.e., f c D _ D, g iff, for all x E D, 
if f(x) is defined, then g(x) is defined and f(x) c Ds g(x). 
We also use exponentiations in category S: if S and s’ are sets, S -+ S’ is 
’ We will only use this construction with discretely ordered D so that all partial functions 
are continuous, but the following is the general definition (from Plotkin, 1985): a partial func- 
tion from D to D’ is continuous just if the inverse image of any Scott-open subset of D’ is 
Scott-open in D, where a subset C/ of a domain D is Scott-open iff (i) if u E U and u c D d, 
then s E U, and (ii) for every directed subset S of D, if lub(S) E U then dg U for some dE S. 
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the set of all functions from S to s’, and S-+ S’ is the set of all partial 
functions from S to s’. 
We now define the same constructions in categories offunctors. For any 
(small) category X, let X 3 D be the category of all functors from X to D, 
with all natural transformations as the morphisms, and similarly for X 3 S. 
Let F and G be functors from X to D, x, y, and z be X-objects, andf: x -+ y 
and g: y + z be X-morphisms. Then the four constructions needed are as 
follows: 
(i) Product. 
and 
(Fx G)(x) = F(x) x G(x) 
(Fx G)(f)C(d d’) EJ’(x) x G(x)1 = (f’(fN4, WXd’)). 
(ii) Lifting. 
and 
F,(x) = CF‘(x)ll 
if d=I, 
(y) 
I 9 otherwise. 
(iii) Exponentiation. 
(f’+ G)(x)= m E n [F(Y) 
i 
-G(y)] forallf:x-+yandg:y+z, 
f: .Y - .v 
and 
m(f); G(g) = F(g); m(f; 8) 
I 
, ordered pointwise, 
V’+ Wf)[m E (F-+ G)(x)l(g) =m(f; gh 
where &,,+,( . ..y ... ), with a slight abuse of notation, denotes the set of 
functions m from the set of X-morphisms with domain x to the union of the 
( . . .y . . . ) for all X-objects y, such that, for every X-morphism f: x -+ y, 
m(f)e( .*.y...); 
(iv) Partial exponentiation. 
[F(Y) -G(y)] forallf:x+yandg:y-,z, 
m(f); G(g) s F(g); m(f; g)), ordered pointwise, 
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and 
V’-+ G)(f)Cm E V’--+ G)(x)l(g) = W; g), 
where the c relation on partial functions is graph inclusion. 
For functors to S, the + and -vv) constructions are defined in the same 
way, but are based on the exponentiations for S, rather than D, and the 
sets are not partially ordered. If X is the trivial (one-object and one- 
morphism) category, each of the constructions on functors reduces to the 
corresponding contruction on domains or sets; however, note that, 
although A -vv* B is isomorphic to A -+ B, in S and D, in general F-- G is 
not isomorphic to F + G, in X + S and X + D. 
To motivate the exponential constructions, consider that a procedure 
defined in possible world x might be called in any possible world y 
accessible from x using an X-morphismf: x -+y, and it is the domain struc- 
ture determined by y that should be in effect when the procedure body 
is executed. This suggests that the meaning of a procedure defined in 
possible world zc must be a suitably uniformfnmily of functions, indexed by 
X-morphisms f: x + y. The uniformity condition is commutativity of all 
diagrams 
F(Y) 
m(/-.x-Y) -, G(y) 
For -+, the uniformity condition only requires commutativity when the 
result of the partial mapping along the top of the diagram is defined. 
We also use some of these constructions on contravariant functors from 
X to S or D. The product and lifting operations construct contravariant 
functors in the obvious way, and, for the exponentiation constructions, the 
uniformity conditions are obtained by reversing the vertical arrows; for 
example, if F and G are contravariant functors from X to S, 
[F(Y) --+ G(y)] for all f: x + y and g : y -+ z, 
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that is, commutativity of 
m(f:x-.v) 
F(Y) - G(Y) 
F(g:y+z) 
I I 
G(g:y-z) 
F(z) - m(f;g:x+r) G(z) 
is required whenever the partial function at the bottom gives a defined 
result. We define the morphism part to yield couariant functors; for 
example, 
F’-+ G)(f)Cm E (F-J-+ G)(x)lk) = Nf; 8). 
These constructions will be used to construct meaning functors [y] for 
the phrase types y of our language from the following “primitive” functors, 
where X is now the category of possible worlds defined in Section 3: 
(i) S is the contrauariant functor from X to D defined as follows: for 
any X-object X, S(X) = X, discretely ordered, and for any X-morphism 
f, Q : X -+ Y, S(f, Q) is the function f E Y + X. This is the only functor that 
depends directly on details of category X. 
(ii) For every data type z, [z] is a constant functor (covariant or 
contravariant, as appropriate) from X to D such that, for every X-object 
x, [r]x is the discretely ordered domain of values of type r. 
(iii) T is the (contravariant) constant functor from X to S such that, 
for every X-object x, T(x) is the set {true, false). 
(iv) 1 is the (covariant) constant functor from X to S such that, for 
every X-object x, l(x) = A, for some singleton set A. 
(v) F is the (covariant) functor from D to S that forgets partial 
orderings and treats continuous functions as arbitrary functions. 
(vi) E is the (covariant) functor from S to D that embeds sets into 
the category of domains by discretely ordering them and treating arbitrary 
functions as continuous functions. 
Note that E and F preserve products, E preserve exponentials, and E; F is 
the identity functor on S. 
We can now define functors [0] : X -+ D, and [a], [spec] : X + S. We 
first consider [comm]. In earlier work (Reynolds, 1981b; Oles, 1982; 
Tennent, 1985), command meanings were, for any possible-world X, partial 
functions or binary relations on X. But it turns out to be simpler to use 
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elements of (S-vv) S)(X), where S is the states functor defined above. Then, 
command meanings are X-morphism-indexed families of partial functions, 
and it is no longer necessary to depend on the morphism part of the 
functor to define such families “implicitly.” The uniformity condition for 
such, families allows command execution to become less-defined in more- 
restricted possible worlds, while ensuring that, when such execution is 
defined, the results are consistent with execution in less-restrictive worlds. 
However, we shall not define [comm](X) to be (all of) (S-+ S)(X), 
because this would permit commands that have been defined non-locally 
to modify the values of local variables. The constraint in the following 
definition precludes this. 
For any X-object X, 
[commjX= 
i 
CE(S-+S)(X) forallf,Q:x-+Y,g,R: Y-+Z,andz~Z, 
S(rZ’); 4.L Q; g, R) = c(f, Q; g, R; rz’); WZ’), 
where Z’ = {z’ E Z 1 z'Rz} 
1 
, 
ordered pointwise. The condition ensures that, for every change of possible 
world g, R : Y + Z, execution of c(f, Q; g, R) stays within an R-equivalence 
class. For the morphism part of [comm], let X, Y, and Z be X-objects, and 
f, Q: X-+ Y and g, R: Y -+ Z be X-morphisms; then 
IcommD(A Q)(c)(s, RI = 4f, Q; g, RI. 
The remaining semantic-domain functors are defined in Table III. Note 
that assertions must always be properly truth-valued, but expressions may 
have value 1. The uniformity condition for + ensures that, if an assertion 
or expression is evaluated at some state, all of its sub-expressions are 
TABLE III 
Semantic-domain Functors 
Y 
val[r] 
expC71 
acc[r] 
e + 8’ 
assert 
a + a’ 
0-a 
spec 
urn Functionality of [y] 
I[7n 1 X+D 
S+ [val[s]J X-+D 
171 -+ [commj X-D 
m + uu X+D 
(S;F)-*T x-s 
tan + %a’4 x-+s 
wn; F) -+ Call x-s 
l-1 x+s 
148 R. D. TENNENT 
evaluated at the same state; that is, there can be no “side effects,” not even 
temporary ones. In particular, we have the following 
PROPOSITION 1. For any X-morphisms f: X + Y and g : Y + 2, 
p E [exp[z] --t assertJX, e E [exp[z]j Y and z E Z, p(f)(e)(g)(z) = 
p(f )(e,)( g)(z), where e, E [exp[z]J Y is the “constant” expression-meaning 
such that, for all h: Y + W and w E W, e,,(h)(w) = e(g)(z). 
ProoJ We first establish the lemma 
lIw+blllk~ WK4= IhWDk lewd. 
Consider any X-morphism h : {z} + W and state w  E W; then 
bpCdDk; r~4)kWW) 
= 4g; r{z);h)(w) by the definition of [exp[t]j 
= 4dCWWW by the definition of + 
= e(g)(z) by the definition of r{ z} 
= e&)(z) by the definition of e, 
= lexpCzla(g;r{z})(e,)(h)(w) as with e. 
Now, we prove the proposition as follows: 
p(f)(e)(g)(z) 
=p(f)(4(g%W 
by the definition offassert 1 Y 
= lI=Nlk~r~4Mf )(4l(id&) 
by the definition of [assertj g 
=p(f;g;r{z})([lexpC~lll(g;r{z})(e))(id(,))(z) 
by the definition of [exp[t] -+ assert]X 
=p(f;g;r{z})([expC~lll(g;r{zj)(e,))(id(;))(z) 
by the lemma 
=p(f )(eO)(g)(z) 
as with e. 1 
Specification meanings are not conventional truth values, but rather 
X-morphism-indexed families of “partial elements,” which are either 
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undefined (identified with false), or defined (identified with true), and the 
uniformity condition for -+ ensures that, if t is such a family and t(f: x -+ v) 
is true, then so is t(f; g) for all g: y + z. Thus, t is the characteristic 
function of) a “sieve on 2’ (Goldblatt, 1979), and jrspec] is the subobject 
classifier in the topos X +-S. 
Finally, for any type-assignment rc with rc(r) = /I, for every identifier 
z E dom(rr), we define a (covariant) functor [rc] : X -+ D as the product of 
the [/?,a over the domain of x, where it is understood that, for any of the 
/3, that is an assertional (rather than ordinary) phrase type, IT/?,] : X -+ S is 
first composed with the embedding functor E to obtain a functor from X 
to D. 
5. SEMANTIC VALUATIONS 
We may now interpret the phrases of the language as natural transfor- 
mations from environment functors to meaning functors: 
where [xl, [6] : X -+ D, [a], [spec] : X + S, and F: D + S are the functors 
defined in the preceding section. 
We begin with the purely logical fragment of the specification language. 
The key facts are that (i) the functor category X * S is a topos (this is true 
for any small category X) and (ii) intuitionistic logic may be interpreted in 
any topos (Goldblatt, 1979). The resulting valuations are given in 
Table IV, where, for convenience, the identity function and the undefined 
TABLE IV 
Specifications 
= for all g: J’ -+ I, if [S,]xu(f; g) then [S,]xu(f; g) 
[Vl:/?.SJXldf 
=forallg:y+ zandmEUb]z. Usll;((Unl;F)(f;g)(u)lr~m)(id,) 
uz, =? z,nxuf 
=forallg:y+z. ~uYn~f;g~~~z,nx~~=uYn~f;g~~u~~li~~~~ 
643:X5,2-2 
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TABLE V 
Assertions 
partial function on a singleton set are identified with true and false, respec- 
tively. Here, and throughout this section, x is an X-object, f: x -+ y is 
an X-morphism, and u is a suitable environment; for example, here 
u E ([rc]; F)(x), where 71 is the type-assignment component of the phrase- 
class of the phrase being interpreted. Note the “implicit” quantifications 
over changes of possible world in the valuations for implication, quanti- 
fication, and equivalence. These are required in general to ensure 
“monotonicity”; i.e., for any specification S, [SJxuf implies [Sgxu(f; g) for 
every appropriate g. 
In contrast, the logical operators in assertions may be treated “classi- 
cally” and “pointwise,” as in Table V, where y, E S(y). “Negative” equality 
operators (yielding false if either operand is undefined) can be defined 
using the definedness predicates. It would also be possible to restrict 
quantified identifiers to range over non-l values only, by relativizing 
the quantifier laws in the first-order assertional logic (Scott, 1967, 1979; 
Bencivenga, 1986). 
For procedures, the key facts are that (i) the functor categories X *S 
and X =z= D are Cartesian-closed (this is true for any small category X; see 
Goldblatt, 1979 and Oles, 1982, respectively) and (ii) the typed lambda 
calculus may be interpreted in any such category (Lambek, 1980; 
Scott, 1980; Lambek and Scott, 1986). The resulting valuations (for 
ordinary procedures) are 
and assertional procedures may be treated in a similar way. For identifiers, 
[ljxu = U(I). 
Valuations for the constructs that involve commands (other than the 
variable-declaration block) are given in Table VI. In the equation for 
sequential composition, the semi-colon on the right denotes composition of 
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TABLE VI 
Commands 
= for ally,, y, E S(y), if [[PJxufy, and [CJxufvo =y, then [Q].xu~v, 
= for all g: y  + z and v  E {true, false ), 
w-u ncax4f;d = ucbm; r.m w.23 
where Z, = {z,, E S(i)1 [P]xu(f; g) 2” = v} 
partial functions (in diagrammatic order). The following proposition 
illustrates how non-intererence specifications may be “decomposed”. 
PROPOSITION 2. If 7r( C) = comm and n(P, ) = 7c(P2) = assert, then, for 
any X-object X and u E [r] X, 
[C # PI & C # P, = C # (P, and P2)]Xu(idx). 
Proof: Consider any f, Q: X + Y and assume CC # P,]Xu(f, Q) and 
[C # P,] Xu(f; Q). Consider any g, R : Y -+ Z, v E (true, false >, and 
z. E Z,, where 
Z, = (zv E Z I [P, and PJXu(f, Q; g, R) z, = v>. 
Let vi= UpillWL Q;g, R)z,, for i = 1,2. By the assumption about P,, if 
UCII JWf, Q; g, R) z. is defined, it is equal to [CgXu(f, Q; g, R; rZ,) z. 
cZ1, where 
Z, = (z, E Z I Uf’JlX4A Q: g, fi) z1= vt 1, 
and, by the assumption about P,, if [CjjXu(S, Q; g, R; [Z,) z. is defined, 
it is equal to [CJ Xu(f, Q; g, R; [Z, ; YZ,) zo, where 
Zz = { z2 E Z, I [If’21 JWf, Q; g, R rz, ) Z2 = ~2 ). 
But Z,= {z~EZ, I [PJXu(f, Q;g, R) z2= v2}, by the definition of 
[assertjx, and so Z, G Z,. Then, by the definition of -+ , if [CJ Xu(f, Q; 
g, R; [Z,; rZ,) z. is defined, it is equal to [CJXu(f, Q; g, R; [Z,) zo, 1 
For new-variable declarations, we first define a functor expand, : X -+ X 
for each data type z as 
expand,(X) = Xx [T] X 
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and 
evand,(f, Q : X -, Y) =f,, Qr, 
where d,(x, v) = (f(x), v) and (x,, v,,) Q7(x,, vi) iff xoQx,. For any 
X-morphism f, Q : X -+ Y, the following diagram commutes: 
x I[rD x 
X - expand,(X) 
r,Q 
I I 
e.v~ndr(f. Q, 
Y ----+ expand,( Y) x llrD y 
We can now define the acceptor and expression components 
a,(X) E ([zl -+ [commJ)(expand,(X)) and e,(X) E [exp[z]J(expand,(X)) of 
a “new” variable of data type z in an expanded possible world expand,(X). 
For X-morphisms f, Q : expand,(X) +Yandg,R:Y+Z, and vi~[r] Y, 
a,(X)(f, Q)(v,)(g, R)(z,EZ)=Z~EZ such that 
(i) f(g(zi)) = (x, vl >, where (x, vO> =f( g(zO)), and 
(ii) z&, and dzo) Qg(z,), 
and e,W(f, Q)(yo E Y) = v, where (x, v> =f(yd. 
In the definition of a,, a state zi satisfying the two conditions might not 
exist and then the result is undefined; however, if such a state does exist, 
it must be unique by the injectivity property of X-morphism f, Q;g, R. 
Intuitively, the effect of assigning a value vi to the acceptor is to replace the 
old value vO in the appropriate component of the stack by vi, without 
changing more-local components (condition (ii) or more-global com- 
ponents (i.e., the x in condition (i)). 
The semantic equation for block commands then is 
[new[z] I, I’ in CJ xufyo 
i 
Yl? if lICO(ex~aWx))(~‘) (expand,(f))(y,, v,> 
=~~~~~~~~~~bmn~~ = 
undefined, 
where U’ = ([[In]( x [r]x)(u)l 1 H e,(x)) 
otherwise, 
where v, is a “standard” initial value for variables of type z. The following 
three propositions show, respectively, that 
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(i) assignments to a local variable do not affect non-locally defined 
assertions; 
(ii) a local variable is not affected by non-locally defined commands; 
and 
(iii) a declared variable is a “good” variable; that is to say, 
immediately after an assignment to it, its value is the value just assigned. 
Throughout, UE [n]X, X’ = expand,(X), rc’ = (rt IA H acc[z]lE I-+ 
exp[T]), and u’=([x]( x [~]X)(U)~AH~,(X)I E-z,(X)). 
PROPOSITION 3. Zf P is an identifier (different from A and E) with 
k(P) = assert, then [A # P]X’u’(id,.), where, for any A: acc[?] and 
P: assert, 
A # P=VE,:exp[T].(A:=,E,) # P 
for any identifier E, not free in A or P. 
Proof: Consider any f, Q: X’ + Y and e, E [exp[T]J Y, and let U” = 
( [rr’] (A Q) U’ ) E, H e, ). Consider any g, R : Y + 2 and v E (true, false} and 
let Z,, = {z E ZI [PI] YrL’( g, R) 2 = v}. We must now show that 
WZ,,); (UA :=r EJ Yu”(g, R))= (UA :=r E,l Yu”(g, R; Y-C)); W-C). 
Consider any zO E Z, and suppose [EJ Yu”( g, R)(z,) = v, ; then 
[A : = ~ El1 Yu”( g, R)(z,) 
= ILAD Yu”(g, R)(v,W&d by the equation for : = 
= bccCdli(.L Q)(a,(WNg, R)(v,W,h) by the definition of U” 
= WW Q; g, R)(v, Wzko) by the definition 
of [acc[z]J 
and, if this is defined, it is a state z, EZ such that f(g(zI)) = (x, vl) and 
f (g(z,)) = (x, vO) for some x E X and vO E [r] Z. But then, if p = u(P), 
UPD Yu”k, R) ~1 =P( x U24x;A Q: g, R) 2, 
=z-Gd,)CS( x UW;f, Q;g, RI 4 
= hid,)(x) 
= pq Yd’( g, R) z0 
=v 
and so z1 EZ, and [A :=r E,J Yu”(g, R; rZ,)(z,) =z, as well. 1 
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PROPOSITION 4. If Co is an identeer (different from A and E) with 
n’(C,) = comm, then [C, # E]X’u’(id,,). 
Proof Consider any X-morphism f, Q : X’ + Y, v E [[val[z]j Y and 
YOE Y”> where Y,= {yc Y 1 [aX’u’(f, Q)y=v). Let co=u(Co), 
g, R: X-+ Y be x [rjX;f, Q, and Y’ = { y’ E Y ) y’Ry,}. Then, by the defini- 
tion of e,(X), Y’ E Y, and y, E Y’, and so, if c,(g, R)( yo) is defined, it is 
equal to c,(g, R; r Y’)(y,), by the definition of [commj. But then, by the 
definition of S-+ S, it is also equal to c,(g, R; r Y,)(y,). 1 
PROPOSITION 5. [gv,(A, E)j X’u’(idXss), where, for any A : acc[r ] and 
E: exp[z], 
gv,(A, E) z VE,: exp[z] .VP: exp[z] + assert 
A # P* {P(E,)} A :=T E,(P(E)) 
for any identifiers E, and P not free in A or E, where, for any A : acc[z] and 
P: exp[z’] + assert, 
A # P=VE,:exp[r’].A # E,*A # P(E,) 
for any identiJier El not free in A or P, where, for any A: acc[z], 
El : exp[z’] and Q: assert, 
A # E,=VE,:exp[T].(A:=,E,) # El, 
and 
A # Q=VEZ:exp[z].(A:=,EZ) # Q 
for any identiJier E, not free in A, El, or Q. 
Proof: Consider any X-morphism f: X’ -+ Y, e0 E irexpC~l1 Y, 
p E [exp[T] + assertjj Y, and let n” be (k 1 E, H exp[z] ) PH exp[z] -+ 
assert) and U” E [x”] Y be ([TX’] fu’ 1 E, H e, 1 P HP). Consider any 
g: Y + Z and assume [A # PI Yu”g. We must show that [( P(Eo) > A : = T 
E,{ P(E)}] Yu”g. Consider zo, zI EZ such that a,(X)(f)(v)(g)(zo) =z,, 
where v=e,(g)(z,). Then, by the definitions of a, and e,, e,(X)(f;g) 
(zr) = v. Let e, E [exp[r]l Y be the constant expression meaning whose 
value is always v. 
We now use the assumption that [A # PI Yu”g; i.e., that 
([VE,: exp[z] . A # E, *A # P(E,)IJ Yu”g, 
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to derive that 
[A # E, + A # P(E,)JZ(irn”J &‘I E, t+ d)(id,), 
where e: = [exp[z]Jgev. But the value of E, is ei,, a constant expression- 
meaning, and so 
[VE,:exp[z].(A :=,EZ) # P(E,)]Z([d’j gu”IE,HeL,)(id,). 
But then 
U(A : = T EJ # J’(E, 11 Z( Udl gu” I E, ++ 4 I E2 ++ IexpC~lll redid,) 
and, since execution of the assignment preserves the value of P(E,), 
[l=pC~l --f assertllg(p)(id,)(e:)(id,)(z,) 
= [Texpbl -, assertns(p)(id,)(e:)(id,)(z,), 
i.e., 
p(g)([rexp[rlnge,)(id,)(z,)=p(g)([[exp[z]llge,)(id,)(z,), 
i.e., 
Uassertl g(p(id y)(e,)WzKzo) = Uassertll gMid ,)(e,))(id,)(z, 1, 
i.e., 
hidyNe,) =didy)(evNg)(zl), 
and then, by using Proposition 1 twice, we get that 
did y)(eo)kh) =dd yNbN~lI f(e,(W))(g)(z,), 
which is sufficient to prove the desired result. 1 
6. FORMAL SYSTEM AND SOUNDNESS 
The purely logical part of the formal system presented in Reynolds 
(1982) is essentially (the negative fragment of) many-sorted intuitionistic 
predicate logic with equality; however, occurrences of the static-assertion 
specification (false} should be replaced by the new constant absurd to 
allow for the possible world in which the set of states is empty. 
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The non-logical axioms relevant to the fragment interpreted here are 
l the a, 8, and q laws of the typed lambda calculus; 
l Hoare-like axioms, such as 
P> GK?l& {Ql CI {RI * P> Co; C, 
l command equivalences, such as 
(Co; cl); c, = comm co; (C,; Cd; 
. non-interference decomposition axioms, such as 
C # P, & C # P2 =z- C # (P, and P,); 
. variable-declaration axioms, of the form 
(VA : acc[r] . VE: exp[r] 
.gv,(A,E)&...&A # Ei&4kCj # E&L... =+ 
=- {P} newCzl4 Ein WANE){Q}, 
where P and Q are assertion identifiers, H is an 
{P) H(A)(E)(Q)) 
identifier of type 
acc[z] -+ (exp[z] + comm), and the E; and C, are expression-like and 
command-like identifiers, respectively; 
l the axioms of strong constancy and leftside non-interference com- 
position (Reynolds, 1982). 
The only significant modifications necessary to the presentation in 
Reynolds (1982) are that variables must be separated into their acceptor 
and expression components, as in the variable-declaration axiom above, 
and that assertions must be distinguished from Boolean expressions. 
The result desired is 
For SE (X + spec ), [q xuf = true for ail X-objects x, environ- 
ments u E [x1x, and X-morphisms f: .Y -+ y whenever S :: z is 
derivable. 
Validity of the axioms for procedures and for the purely logical fragment 
of specification logic follows from the general category-theoretic considera- 
tions mentioned earlier. The axioms of strong constancy and leftside non- 
interference composition can be treated essentially as discussed in the intro- 
ductory section. Most of the remaining axioms can be straightforwardly 
validated from the definitions or the propositions proved earlier. 
Difficulties arise with axioms dealing with non-interference for higher- 
order phrases. An example was given in the Introduction of a failure of 
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rightside non-interference decomposition with a higher-order command- 
like phrase. Another problem is that non-local command-like procedural 
meanings in our model can interfere with the value of a local variable, and 
it is therefore not possible to validate variable-declaration axioms involving 
higher-order C,. Possible approaches to solution of these problems will be 
discussed in the Concluding Remarks. 
The author does not yet know whether comparable difficulties arise with 
higher-order expression-like phrases on the right-hand side of #, but he 
has not succeeded in validating leftside non-interference decomposition 
with a higher-order phrase on the right, or showing that non-local higher- 
order expression-like phrases are not interfered with by assignments to 
local variables. 
It should be straightforward to extend the interpretation to control 
structures such as conditionals and loops and to allow for coercions and 
generic operators. Hoare-like axioms that would normally use Boolean 
expressions as assertions must be slightly modified; for example, the while 
axiom would be 
{P and E=true} C (P} =s- {P} while Edo C{P and E=false}, 
where true and false are Boolean constants. Recursion per se should not be 
problematical, but the introduction of non-terminating expressions may 
complicate the derived rules for function-definition blocks, and the defini- 
tion of a class of predicates admissible for fixed-point induction in 
Reynolds (1982) may require modification. 
Jumps require a form of continuation semantics for commands, and then 
the Hoare-triple form of specification must be re-interpreted along the lines 
described in Section 4.2.3 of Reynolds, (1981a), and similarly for non- 
interference specifications. This will be explained in detail in a sequel to this 
work. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Specification logic is an Algol-like (Reynolds, 1981b) programming logic. 
It is statically typed. It avoids making references explicit. It treats substitu- 
tion, binding and scope correctly. It includes the laws of the (typed) 
lambda calculus as a sub-system. It requires expressions to be side-effect- 
free. It distinguishes between the logic for data types and the logic for 
phrase types. It provides “generic” facilities such as quantification and 
non-interference uniformly for all relevant phrase types. And, finally, we 
have shown here that it “obeys a stack discipline” (though this operational 
terminology is inappropriate for logical phrase types) in that “local” 
changes to storage structure, such as state-set expansions and restrictions, 
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can be allowed for by using possible-world semantics without making the 
worlds explicit in the logical language. 
The difficulties with non-interference for higher-order phrases appear to 
be fundamental. One possible approach, suggested to the author by 
P. O’Hearn, is to re-interpret G # P for higher-order G to capture the 
intuition that G(C) can interfere with P only by using C; with Reynolds’ 
interpretation, G(C) is unconstrained when C interferes with P. A satisfac- 
tory interpretation along these lines would be most welcome because it 
would necessitate only very minor changes to the formal system of 
specification logic. Further evidence that the problems may arise from 
Reynolds’ definitions of higher-order non-interference is the fact that when 
both operands of # are higher-order, the reductions are applicable in two 
ways, and the results do not seem to be equivalent. 
Another direction that could be explored is suggested by the realization 
that a kind of “weak converse” of non-interference decomposition is 
needed, along the lines of non-interference composition. Since non- 
interference formulas are typically used as assumptions for Hoare-triple 
formulas, this might be feasible, but would require significant modifications 
to the logic. 
The most drastic “solution” to the problems of non-interference might be 
to avoid them completely by adopting a syntactic method of interference 
control, along the lines of Reynolds, (1978). In fact, the most unsatisfactory 
aspect of specification logic in practice is the inconvenience of having to 
deal explicitly with non-interference and good-variable assumptions. Syn- 
tactic constraints to achieve interference control would restrict expressivity 
somewhat, but would be helpful to language implementers as well as 
program verifiers. 
Specification logic, in its present state of development, also seems inade- 
quate to deal with situations in which representational abstraction is 
involved, as in Chapter 5 of Reynolds, ( 198 la). For example, in the 
absence of concurrency it should be possible to allow for “benevolent” side 
effects (Hoare, 1972), in which the representation of an abstract object is 
changed but its abstract properties are presered. 
Refinements of the model to more closely approach the ideal of full 
abstraction (Stoughton, 1988; Meyer, and Sieber, 1988) are also possible. 
For example, the equivalence new[z] A, E in C- eOmm C, where C is a 
command identifier, fails in our model only because the local component 
of a command meaning can be less defined than its non-local component. 
But such a command is not expressible, and so it is only necessary to 
further constrain elements c of [comm] as follows: for any f, 
Q : X-+ Y, g, R: Y--t 2 and R-equivalence class Z’, if gZ’ = Y then 
S(g, R); c(f, Q) = c(f, Q; g, R); S(g, R); this ensures that, whenever 
g, R: Y + Z is a pure expansion, execution in Z is not less defined than 
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execution in Y. It would also be desirable to establish an “adequacy” 
correspondence between the denotational model and an appropriate 
operational semantics. 
APPENDIX 
The following example, from a personal communication to the author by 
J. C. Reynolds, demonstrates the undesirable consequences of adopting full 
classical (rather than intuitionistic) logic as the logical basis for specifica- 
tion logic. From the rules for assignment, skip, and statement compound- 
ing, one derives 
By mathematical-fact introduction, static implication, and consequent 
weakening: 
gv(x)& {x=3}+-{x=3}skip;x:= 4 {false). 
Let S be the formula {x = 3) skip; x : = 4 {false}. Then, 
gv(x)& -IS& {x=3} *absurd, 
and, since absurd implies anything, 
gv(x)& lS& {x=3}=>(true} skip {false}. 
Now, strong constancy gives us 
skip# (x=3)&({x=3}~{true)skip{false}) 
=c. {x=3} skip {false} 
and so, since skip # (x = 3), we get 
gv(x)& TS=S {x=3} skip {false}. 
However, by assignment, gv(x) * {false}; x := 4 {false}, so that statement 
compounding gives us 
gv(x)&lS*{x=3}skip;x:=4(false}, 
i.e., gv(x) &lS* S, so that gv(x) + 11s. Finally, with classical logic, we 
get gv(x) =z- S, which asserts that the assignment x : = 4 does not terminate 
if x initially has a value other than 4. 
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